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Death Penalties: The Supreme Court's Obstacle Course. By 
Raoul Berger. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982. 
Raoul Berger's latest book, Death Penalties: The Supreme 
Court's Obstacle Course, is a new verse of the same old song. Like 
Government by Judiciary, the book attacks the Supreme Court for 
violating the original understanding of a provision of the Consti-
tution (this time the eighth amendment). Like the earlier book, it 
also contains "the clearly articulated theme that the principal, in-
deed the only, criterion for constitutional interpretation is the 'in-
tent' of the framers." 1 Both books ultimately fail to persuade the 
reader of the accuracy of their historical conclusions or the valid-
ity of their theory of constitutional interpretation. 
Berger disclaims any intention to argue further his "interpre-
tivist" or "originalist"2 theories, instead resting on copious refer-
ences to his earlier work.3 He purports to confine Death Penalties 
to a demonstration of the ''wide gap between what the Justices say 
the 'cruel and unusual punishments' clause 'requires' and the lim-
ited purpose the Framers meant it to serve."4 In fact, several 
chapters are devoted to the underlying interpretivist premise, in-
cluding one chapter generally attacking judicial review,s and one 
attempting to limit the language of the Constitution to its 1789 
common law meaning.6 Another chapter condemns the incorpo-
ration doctrine, 1 which seems rather superfluous in light of Ber-
I. Murphy, Constitutional Interpretation: The Art of the Historian, Magician, or 
Stateman?, 87 YALE L.J. 1752, 1752 (1978). 
2. For origins and comparisons of the two terms, see generally Brest, The Miscon-
ceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980); J. ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
3. R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT's OBSTACLE COURSE 9 
n.29 ( 1982). 
4. ld at 9. 
5. Ch. 5: The Role of the Coun. This chapter is a rather shallow survey of carefully 
selected quotations from various eighteenth century politicians and jurists, designed to dis-
credit judicial review by showing the framers' "profound distrust" of judicial discretion. 
Berger either fails to note, or quotes and ignores, any references to the judiciary as the least 
dangerous branch or contemporaneous statements supporting judicial review. See id at 78-
79, quoting from Hamilton in Federalist No. 78 on the weakness of the judiciary, without 
any follow-up and without referring to the statements in the same document which suppon 
the concept of judicial review. See also Bedau, Berger's Defense of the Death Penalty: How 
Not to Read the Constitution, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1152, 1155-56 & n.22 (1983). 
6. Ch. 4: Co=on Law Terms in the Constitution. 
7. Ch. 2: Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: En Bloc or Selective. Berger's criti-
cism of incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause is tarnished by his 
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ger's main thesis that the eighth amendment itself does not bar 
capital punishment. The point of these chapters-and perhaps of 
the entire book-may be found in Berger's description of "the 
proper role of the Court": 
It is not wrapped in mystery. Fearful of the greedy expansiveness of power, the 
Founders sought to confine their delegates to the power conferred. To insure that 
their delegates would not 'overleap' those bounds, the courts were designed to 
police those boundaries . . . . [T]here is not the slightest intimation that the 
courts might supersede the legislature's exercise of power w1~hin its boundaries. a 
Finally, Berger suggests two remedies for the Court's usurpa-
tion of legislative authority. The first is simply to foster a popular 
awareness that "the people . . . are wrongfully being deprived of 
the right to decide for themselves whether or not to enact death 
penalties .... "9 His second suggested remedy borders on their-
responsible. He devotes an entire chapter to invoking and justify-
ing a Congressional withdrawal of jurisdiction over capital cases 
from the federal courts, including the Supreme Court.•o Such a 
withdrawal of jurisdiction would at least nominally make the 
most recent Supreme Court pronouncement•• "the unchangeable 
law of the land ... beyond the reach of the United States 
Supreme Court or state supreme courts to alter or overrule."12 It 
is also a course "so fraught with constitutional doubt that al-
though talked about from time to time, it has not been invoked for 
over one hundred years."•3 
failure to deal adequately with the alternative argument that the privileges and immunities 
clause might easily be read to accomplish the same result. Cf J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST 28-30 & n.64 (1980); Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Cniique of Raoul Berger's 
History, 54 N.Y.U.L. REv. 651,673-75 (1979). Berger attempts to refute this argument by 
resorting to his much-criticized contention that the entire fourteenth amendment, including 
the privileges and immunities clause, was intended solely to protect the rights enumerated 
in the 1866 Civil Rights Act. BERGER, supra note 3, at 98-99. For criticism of Berger's 
historical evidence for this conclusion, see Soifer, supra. 
8. BERGER, supra note 3, at 86-87. 
9. Id at 9. 
10. Ch. 7: Congressional Contraction of Judicial Jurisdiction. 
II. At this writing, one of the most recent cases happens to be one in which the Court 
reversed imposition of the death penalty for failure to consider mitigating factors, Eddings 
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), but as Berger notes, the Court has been neither consis-
tent nor predictable in this area. 
12. Resolution of Conference of Chief Justices, January 1982, cited in Apr. 1982 
A.B.A.J. J86. 
13. ELY, supra note 2, at 46 (footnotes omitted). See also Van Alstyne, A Critical 
Guide to Ex parte McCardle, !5 ARIZ. L. REv. 229, 264-66 (1973) (suggesting that Congress 
cannot withdraw jurisdiction solely because of its dissatisfaction with the likely substantive 
outcome). 
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I. BERGER'S HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
Berger's historical survey is detailed and comprehensive, al-
though largely devoted to refuting Anthony Granucci's seminal 
article on the historical roots of the eighth amendment.J4 Berger 
begins with the Magna Carta, runs through the 1689 Bill of 
Rights, details crimes and punishments in England and the 
United States both before and after the adoption of the eighth 
amendment, and concludes that the term "cruel and unusual" is 
limited to punishments that are both "barbarous" and "no longer 
customary."Js He stops just shortJ6 of committing himself to the 
position that to be prohibited by the clause a punishment must 
have been "no longer customary" by 1689. The strongest part of 
his argument focuses on the framers' specific intent to exclude 
capital punishment from the category of prohibited punish-
ments.J7 Berger here marshalls impressive historical evidence on 
the intent to exclude, including the reference to deprivation of life 
in the fifth amendment. His argument overlooks, however, the 
significant distinction between using history to show that the 
framers intended to prohibit a certain practice and using the same 
history to create the negative inference that they did not intend to 
prohibit it.Js His narrow definition of cruel and unusual as "no 
longer customary" also drains the clause of significance. It hardly 
seems necessary to safeguard the right to be free from punish-
ments that are no longer authorized or imposed.J9 
Moreover, Berger's historical analysis is seriously flawed. He 
is highly selective and inconsistent in his use of sources. For ex-
14. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Injlicted':· The Original Meaning, 
57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969). 
15. BERGER, supra note 3, at 444. 
16. /d at 41-42. 
17. /d at 44-50. 
18. See, e.g .• Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 
349, 397-98 (1974). Berger avoids the most direct violation of this principle: he attempts to 
establish not only that the framers did not intend to outlaw capital punishment but also 
that they specifically intended no/ to outlaw it. Berger's negative inference, however, is still 
subject to the basic criticism that the framers' intent cannot be determined with any cer-
tainty beyond the specific evils they were attempting to curb. 
19. Berger nowhere defines "customary," but since he rejects the Court's analogy to 
being struck by lightning, and relies heavily on "popular support" for death penalty stat-
utes, see, e.g. BERGER, supra note 3, at 66, 116 n.l9, presumably the death penalty will be 
constitutional until it no longer commands sufficient support to allow its enactment or im-
position. In this context, it would be interesting to know Berger's opinion of Enmund v. 
Florida, -U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982) in which the Supreme Court vacated a death 
sentence imposed in a felony-murder case where the defendant "neither took life, at-
tempted ~o ~e life, n~r intended to take life." /d at 3371. Justice White relied primarily 
on a statistical analysts demonstrating the rarity with which capital punishment is either 
authorized or imposed under such circumstances. 
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ample, when it suits his purpose, he emphasizes the significance of 
early judicial constructions as "more weighty" because closer in 
time to the Framers.2o Later, in arguing that racially discrimina-
tory imposition of the penalty is irrelevant, he relies heavily on the 
premise that the fourteenth amendment allows blacks to be ex-
cluded from juries.21 He ignores an almost contemporaneous-
and thus under Berger's view highly significant-Supreme Court 
decision invalidating a racially discriminatory jury selection 
system.22 
Berger's interpretations of the historical record are also often 
questionable. For instance, he discusses two early versions of sec-
tion 1 of the fourteenth amendment: Bingham's, which gave Con-
gress the power to "make all laws necessary and proper to secure 
. . . equal protection," and Stevens's, which simply provided that 
"[a]lllaws ... shall operate impartially and equally" without re-
gard to race.23 The distinction, as Berger rightly points out, is that 
Stevens's proposal, unlike Bingham's, would work by its own 
force.24 Berger's distorted perception of history then leads him to 
conclude, despite the unequivocally self-executing language of the 
final version,2s that "Bingham's proposal carried the day."26 He 
cavalierly ignores both the obvious similarities between Stevens' 
proposal and the final version, and the historical evidence that 
section 1 was meant to be self-executing and section 5 was meant 
to confer additional power on Congress.27 
Finally, of course, Berger's vision of the "framer's intent" is 
open to myriad queries and criticisms as to the identities of "the 
framers" (those at Philadelphia? the state legislatures and ratify-
ing conventions?) and whether we can discover the single intent of 
so many long-dead individuals.2s Berger argues that constitu-
tional interpretation must be confined to the intent of the framers 
in order to reflect the consent of the people.29 But those who 
"consented" to Berger's narrow eighteenth century interpretation 
20. BERGER, supra note 3, at 11. 
21. Id 56-57. 
22. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 103 (1880). 
23. BERGER, supra note 3, at 168. 
24. Id 168-69. 
25. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CoNST. Amend. XIV. 
26. BERGER, supra note 3, at 169. 
27. See, e.g., H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 136-139 
(1908). 
28. See generally Brest, supra note 2, at 214-215; Murphy, Constitutional Interpreta-
tion: The Art uf the Historian, Magician, or Statesman?, 87 YALE L.J. 1752, 1755-56 ( 1978). 
29. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 3, at 66: 
Substitution by the Court of its own meaning for that of the Framers changes the 
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of the Constitution "have been dead for a century or two."3o 
Moreover, in the context of the death penalty, those who suffer 
most from its imposition3t were entirely excluded, as a race, not 
only from participation in the ratification process but from the 
rights of citizenship at all.32 
Berger also rejects any argument based on the potential inter-
action between the eighth amendment and the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment.33 He contends that the intent 
of the framers of the fourteenth amendment "militate[s] against 
tampering with" the sentencing process.34 The counter-argu-
ments, which emphasize the Court's role in protecting racial mi-
norities,3s are particularly strong in this context. First, blacks and 
other minorities are disproportionately affected by the criminal 
justice system in general and the death penalty in particular, as 
Berger himself admits.36 Second, the Court's advances in protect-
ing the rights of criminal defendants have often hinged, at least 
implicitly, on the fact that "the notorious facts of each case exem-
plified the national scandal of racist southern justice."37 Finally, 
even Berger's narrow reading of the fourteenth amendment con-
cedes that it was intended as a limited departure from the ordi-
nary idea of state sovereignty, "for the purpose of thwarting 
efforts of the recalcitrant South" to re-enslave blacks.3s Taking all 
of these factors together suggests that precluding the Court from 
supervising the circumstances under which the death penalty is 
scope of the people's consent, displaces the Framers' value choice, and violates 
the basic principle of government by consent of the governed. 
30. ELY, mpra note 2, at II. 
31. See generally Zeisel. Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The 
Florida Experience, 95 HARv. L. REv. 456 (1981). 
32. That this is true of most, if not all. "discrete and insular minorities", United States 
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), is further support for the argument 
that the Court has a special role in interpreting the Constitution to protect such minorities. 
See generally J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 
(1980): ELY, mpra note 2. Berger rejects this theory implicitly in DEATH PENALTIES and 
explicitly elsewhere. See Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial Review," 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87 
(1981). 
33. BERGER, mpra note 3, at 53-58. 
34. fd at 55. He also repeats his arguments, first outlined in GOVERNMENT BY JUDI-
CIARY, about "anti-Negro sentiments" in the North, id at 57-58. This theory has been 
attacked elsewhere. See, e.g., Soifer, mpra note 7. 
35. See note 32 mpra and accompanying text. 
36. BERGER, mpra note 3, at 4; see also Zeisel. mpra note 31; Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S: 238, 247-48 & n.IO (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). The sentencing procedure is es-
pecially vulnerable to class-based discrimination: "[t]here is tremendous potential for the 
arbitrary or invidious infiiction of 'unusually' severe punishments on persons of various 
classes other than 'our own.'" ELY, mpra note 2, at 97. 
37. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE 
L.J. 1287, 1306 (1982). 
38. Berger, mpra note 3, at 91-92. See also Ely, mpra note 2, at 33. 
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imposed would defeat one of the historic purposes of the four-
teenth amendment. 
Berger's historical analysis of the Supreme Court cases on 
capital punishment39 is largely a reiteration of his earlier argu-
ments on the true meaning of the clause and the limited role of the 
courts.40 He does persuasively demonstrate the cases' utter incon-
sistency with one another. The Court itself has recently explained 
this inconsistency as a continuous attempt, sensitive to the need 
for modification in light of perceived inadequacies of each preced-
ing approach, to "provide standards for a constitutional death 
penalty that would serve both goals of measured, consistent appli-
cation and fairness to the accused."4I The only novel argument in 
this chapter is Berger's contention that judicial supervision of the 
sentencing process undermines the traditional jury function of dis-
pensing mercy.42 In fact, since the Court's interference with jury 
verdicts has ultimately had the effect of requiring greater leniency 
and a greater consideration of individual mitigating factors,4J the 
jury's ability to be merciful is left untouched. It is only only the 
jury's ability to be arbitrarily vengeful that is curtailed. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF ORIGINAL INTENT 
The underlying premise of the book is that by interpreting 
the eighth amendment as it has, the Court has violated "the right 
of the people to govern themselves": 
The Court's revision of ihe "cruel and unusual punishments" clause is but one 
more arrogation of power under ihe aegis of ihe Fourteenih Amendment, but 
anoiher chapter in the tale of judicial make-believe.44 
This underlying premise raises two important questions, one re-
garding the proper scope of constitutional interpretation and one 
touching broader issues in the philosophy of language. I do not 
propose to enter the interpretivistjnon-interpretivist debate at this 
point, as the arguments have been well-rehearsed elsewhere,4s and 
the dichotomy may not be as clear as the proponents of both posi-
39. Ch. 6: The Cases. His discussion centers on Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349 (1910); McGauiha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
40. See BERGER, supra note 3, at 112-13. 
41. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111 (1982). 
42. BERGER, supra note 3, at 144-46. 
43. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 
(1978). 
44. BERGER, supra note 3, at 8. 
45. See, e.g., Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 
(1975); Linde, Judges, Critics anti the Realist Tradilion, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972); 
Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 117 (1978); 
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tions once thought. 46 
Even assuming, however, that the intent of the framers is rel-
evant-{)r dispositive-there remains the question of how to 
translate the subjective intent of numerous individuals, as tran-
scribed into a set of phrases, into a broad rule governing the inter-
pretation of those phrases. Berger's rather simplistic approach is 
to ask, in essence, what the phrase meant as a term of art at com-
mon law.47 As Paul Brest has pointed out, however, 
[t]he mere fact that a phrase appears in a formal legal utterance ... does not 
entail that it was used as a term of art. This is especially true of constitutional 
provisions. Although the ratifying conventions that adopted the Constitution and 
the legislatures that adopted the amendments included many lawyers, the vast 
majority of participants were laypersons, and it cannot simply be assumed that 
they used the phrase in its technical sense.48 
Moreover, depending on the level of generality from which the 
framers' "intention" is derived, even terms of art can be under-
stood to convey broader protection than that accorded by Berger. 
The common law referent of a term of art might be simply an 
illustrative example of a broader principle: a non-customary pun-
ishment is cruel and unusual, but it may not be the only type of 
punishment that is.49 Another way to state this is to note that a 
principle is not limited to those applications envisioned by its 
author. so 
Berger's probable response to this line of argument would be 
to rely on the framers' specific intent to exclude capital punish-
ment from the prohibition of the clause. At this point, the analysis 
must take a more philosophical tum. The question becomes to 
what extent an author's subjective intent can limit the interpreta-
tions of the hearer or reader. It is by now almost a first principle 
of contemporary philosophy of language that a speaker cannot, by 
subjective intent alone, determine the meaning to be accorded his 
words.s1 Thus, if the words "cruel and unusual" are capable of 
Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited· Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 
N.W.U.L. REv. 417 (1976). 
46. See ELY, supra note 2. 
47. BERGER, supra note 3, at 61-65. 
48. Brest, supra note 2, at 206 n.ll. 
49. For an elaboration of the difference between an example, or "conception", and a 
principle, or "concept", seeR. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-37 (1979). See 
also Bedau, supra note 5, at 1161 & n.43. 
50. See Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 797, 806 
(1982); see also L. WnTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 33e: 
Someone says to me: "Shew the children a game." I teach them gaming with dice, 
and the other says, "I didn't mean that sort of game." Must the exclusion of the 
game have come before his mind when he gave me the order? 
51. See, e.g., W.V.O. QUINE, WoRD & OBJECT (1960); S. CAVELL, MUST WE MEAN 
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bearing the interpretation the Court has placed on them, the 
Framers' subjective intention to limit the words is irrelevant. As 
one scholar has noted, "[t]he text interposes itself between the in-
tentions of the framers and the problems of the present, cutting off 
the range of permissible access and references to original intent 
.... "52 As Justice Brennan has suggested, approval of the cruel 
and unusual punishments clause over the objection that "the 
Clause might someday prevent the legislature from inflicting . . . 
death" creates an inference that the majority was "prepared to run 
that risk. "53 
That the words of the clause can plausibly, as a matter of 
everyday meaning, be interpreted as a bar against capital punish-
ment is the tacit assumption behind Berger's resort to the legisla-
tive history. Furthermore, the clause may not be intended to 
delineate specific prohibited punishments, but instead may be an 
invitation to future generations to interpret the clause.54 This is a 
particularly satisfying interpretation from a philosophical stand-
point, as it recognizes that an author is not always fully aware of 
his own "intentions."55 This theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion was articulated by a member of the Supreme Court interpret-
ing the fourteenth amendment shortly after its ratification: 
It is possible that those who framed [the amendment) were not themselves 
aware of the far reaching character of its terms. They may have had in mind but 
one particular phase of social and political wrong which they desired to redress. 
Yet, if the amendment, as framed and expressed, does in fact bear a broader 
meaning, and does extend its protecting shield over those who were never thought 
of when it was conceived and put in form, and does reach social evils which were 
never before prohibited by constitutional enactment, it is to be presumed that the 
American people, in giving it their imprimatur, understood what they were doing, 
and meant to decree what has in fact been decreed.56 
WHAT WE SAY 38-39 (1%9): "an individual's intentions or wishes can no more produce the 
general meaning for a word than they can produce horses for beggars"; Schauer, supra note 
50, at 811: "the conventions of language use are superior, in the hierarchy of interpretive 
tools, to the intention of the speaker. 
52. Schauer, supra note 50, at 809. 
53. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 263 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also 
Schauer, supra note 50, at 825. Berger responds at Brennan's argument by returning to the 
inclusion of references to capital punishment in the Fifth Amendment, BERGER, supra note 
3, at 46-47, but he does not explain why of the two inconsistent clauses the Fifth Amend-
ment takes precedence. 
54. See, e.g., EL v, supra note 2, at 13-14; Brest, supra note 2 at 216-17 ( 1980); see also 
Dworkin, Law As /nJerpretation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 527, 539-40 (1982) (an author's intentions 
can include "the intention to create something independent of his intentions"). 
55. See CAVELL, supra note 51 at 40; DwoRKIN, supra note 54, at 538. 
56. Live-stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & 
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (No. 8,408) (C.C.D. La. 1870) (Bradley, J.). It is 
ironic that Berger cites Justice Bradley's opinion in this case in suppon of his contention 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed solely to protect rights encompassed by the 
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The most recent debate about theories of judicial review may 
have been sparked by Roe v. Wade, 57 as the last was by Brown v. 
Board of Education 58 (and the first this century by the invalidation 
of much New Deal legislation in the name of substantive due pro-
cess. )59 Berger does seem motivated, at least in part, by a desire to 
entice the Court away from its latest flirtation with Lochnerian60 
doctrines. He explicitly accuses Justice Brennan of pure Lochner-
izing6I and repeatedly states that judges should not pass on the 
wisdom of laws.62 He may, however, be weakening his own case 
and doing the Court a disservice. As John Hart Ely has pointed 
out, the Eighth Amendment contains its own limits, in contrast to 
the open-endedness of substantive due process: "The subject is 
punishments, not the entire range of government action, and even 
in that limited area the delegation to the interpreter is not entirely 
unguided .... "63 The constant invocation of Lochner to criticize 
cases in which the Court has at least attempted to tie its decision 
to specific constitutional language is likely to have the unintended 
effect of making the Court-and its critics-immune to such a 
charge when it really counts.64 If Berger seriously desires to advo-
cate principled decision-making, he must learn to distinguish un-
principled decisions from decisions with which he disagrees. 
Suzanna Sherry* 
1866 Civil Rights Act. BERGER, .111pra note 3, at 94-95 & n.81. Justice Bradley does reach 
this conclusion, as an afterthought, 15 F. Cas. at 655, but interprets both the Act and the 
Amendment to encompass much broader rights than those suggested by Berger. In fact, 
Justice Bradley gives the privileges and immunities clause the broadest possible construc-
tion, and only then concludes that "the first section of the [civil rights) bill covers the same 
ground as the fourteenth amendment. . . ." /d 
57. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
59. See Meeks, Foreword, Symposium: Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42 OHIO 
ST. L.J. I, 2 (1981). 
60. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
61. BERGER, supra note 3, at 120 n.32. 
62. See, e.g., id at 80-81. 
63. Ely, supra note 2, at 14. 
64. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo(f A Commenr on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
920, 943-44 (1973). See also DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 527: 
[L)egal practice is an exercise in interpretation .... Law so conceived is deeply 
and thoroughly political. Lawyers and judges cannot avoid politics in the broad 
sense of political theory. But law is not a matter of personal or partisan politics, 
and a critique of law that does not understand this difference will provide poor 
understanding and even poorer guidance. 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
-
